Modes of Nuclear Proliferation
Modes of Nuclear Proliferation
Nations seeking a nuclear weapon follow a few set paths to ‘the bomb’ ; these paths are a product of a given geopolitical, security, and domestic environment and dictate the speed, openness, and in most cases success of a nuclear program seeking a weapon. This is highly relevant today given the current citation in Iran and what I think will be a shift in strategy by the Iranians due to the failure of their deterrence model. All credit for these various models goes to Vipin Narang’s book ‘Seeking the Bomb; Strategies of Nuclear Proliferation’
Passive Nuclear Proliferation Strategies
Technical Hedging:
““explicitly not now, but implicitly not never.””
Puts in place technological capabilities to enable a military program at a future date but no explicit military or weaponization programs are underway. Examples of technical hedges would be inclusive of civilian energy programs and infrastructure including enrichment of non weapons grade fissile materials. This is really nuclear latency, it’s a technical capability with a lack of intent for weaponization. Technical hedgers may have internal elements that would seek a bomb but lack the political consensus to do so.
Insurance Hedging:
““explicitly not now, but explicitly in the future if X happens.””
Insurance hedgers take steps to reduce breakout time should a threat (often specific) emerge. These steps include theoretical weaponization work, domestic nuclear fuel production and advanced enrichment capabilities, and work on dual use devices like delivery systems (typically ballistic missiles). Users of this strategy typically use the latent threat of breakout either as a deterrent effect on a potential adversary or a coercive measure to allies to ensure protection. A good example of an insurance hedger is South Korea, who uses its hedge to both deter the DPRK and ensure continued US involvement in the region.
Hard Hedging:
““explicitly not now, but explicitly not never.””
Threshold nuclear states with all/many of the pieces for a functional weapons program but that stop short of taking the final steps towards weaponization. They have the capabilities to produce weapons grade fissile material, weapon designs, delivery vehicles, and political/military command and control organizations to manage nuclear weapons. Nuclear armament for these states is part of mainstream political debate with some committing to a path of proliferation (India) while some abandon the pursuit (Sweden) and others remain in limbo (Iran).
Active Nuclear Proliferation Strategies
Sprinting:
An open and determined effort to develop nuclear weapons as quickly as possible. This is the strategy that most people think of when discussing nuclear weapons proliferation and is best exemplified by the Manhattan Project. This is an all out effort by which states seek to develop capabilities to enrich fissile material expressly for military reasons, delivery vehicles and command & control (C2) for the management of nuclear arms. If, like in the US, China and the USSR, a state is economically capable and geopolitically immune from attempts to halt these efforts, sprinting is very effective. That said successful sprints are rare as the immunity to counter proliferation efforts required has thus far only been present for first generation proliferators (P5 members).
Sheltered Pursuit:
Sheltered pursuit is the development of a nuclear weapon shielded by the tolerance of a major power. The major power not only does not seek to counter proliferate but also deters other powers from doing so shielding the proliferator from military, diplomatic and economic actions. The client state attempts to achieve a nuclear breakout prior to their period of shelter ending. It’s worth noting that it is rarely in the sheltering state’s interests for proliferation to occur, super powers often want to be the only ally with nukes in order to control the escalatory ladder, but proliferation may be seen by the sheltering state as preferable to some other outcome. Classic examples of sheltered pursuit are North Korea, China preferred a nuclear DPRK over a fallen north, and Israel/Pakistan with US regional interests overriding US non-proliferation interests.
Sheltered pursuit has a high chance of success if the sheltered state can complete development prior to that shelter eroding.
Hidden:
Secret bases and hidden efforts hiders attempt to develop nuclear capabilities in the shadows often due to fear of coercion or military action by regional or major powers. Hiders trade speed for stealth and often use methods that are slower but easier to hide (typically uranium rather than plutonium enrichment) and seek either to gain a significant head start or ideally complete a weapon prior to discovery. Notably, hiding has only ever worked for one nation, South Africa, a nation that is also noteworthy for being the only country to ever give up its nuclear capability entirely. Other examples of this strategy include Iraq, Syria, Taiwan, Iran (until 2003) and many more, oftentimes these efforts meet kinetic or coercive ends.
Iran:
Dr. Narang’s flow chart is a great tool here and I want to look at it in light of recent events in Iran. As noted above Iran was, at time or writing, classified as a hard hedger, a strategy characterized by a nation having all pieces in place for weapons development but not having made that last step to actively acquire a weapon.
Indeed Iran has all the pieces in place:
- A robust and well known enrichment program for fissile material capable of high levels of enrichment
- Known weapons designs including fairly advanced implosion designs suitable for missile use.
- Sophisticated ballistic missile program for delivery, mostly IRBMs and SRBMs
- C2 practices for management of weapons and delivery systems
Despite all of this remained a hedger because they did not have a political consensus around the development of nuclear weapons (despite conventional wisdom to the contrary). Iran was (at time of writing) a signatory of the NPT (non proliferation treaty) and domestically under a fatwa issued by Ali Khamenei preventing the development of nuclear arms and most significantly had signed and complied with the JCPOA until the Trump Administration pulled out of the deal during his first term (plug for The Deal a podcast on the JCPOA).
So where are we going? Iranian deterrence has utterly failed, their network of proxies has been mostly neutered in the last year with Hamas, Syria (Assad), Hezbollah, and the Houthis more or less being taken off the board and Iran’s conventional ballistic missile and drone capabilities have proved to be relatively ineffective against Israeli and US air and missile defence systems. Given that conventional and proxy deterrence has failed it would be logical for Iran to seek a more significant deterrent in the form of nuclear armament. Additionally in light of Iran’s current security situation it is not far-fetched to assume that Iranian political thought towards nuclear armament has likely changed in the last few days.
The next step on the flow chart above is sprinting, you’ll remember that sprinting requires permissive security and economic environments to work typically but I would not be so quick to discount an Iranian sprint. Short of a ground invasion the seizure and destruction of all Iranian nuclear material is, from my view, impossible. A ground invasion is politically unpalatable to the US and numerically impossible for the IDF; given the state of sanctions economic coercion probably can’t get much worse either. It seems possible that Iran could perform a ‘hidden sprint’ using its, currently unlocated, stockpile of HEU, distributed centrifuge systems, and existing nuclear knowledge to quickly produce a nuclear device.
Let’s say that the sprint is not possible given the total air dominance Israel and the US enjoy over Iran. We’ll skip sheltered pursuit, Russia and China have made no effort to support Iran in the current conflict, Russia’s lack of support went as far as this weird statement from Putin about Israeli russian speakers. Our final stop is a hidden program, a place Iran was in 2003, success in this is unlikely but not impossible and this time Iran is starting with more knowledge and more material.
Most importantly with either outcome it is likely Iran has moved from the latent proliferator camp into the active proliferation camp. The US and IDF by showing that conventional and proxy deterrence are insufficient to shelter Iran have ironically made a compelling case for nuclear deterrence. Probably should have stuck with the JCPOA.
Books Mentioned in this post:
